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1 Introduction 
As metropolitan centres, East Africa’s capital cities are barely a century old. They have 
grown significantly over the past four decades since national independence, absorbing 
people of a variety of ethnic identities and levels of national consciousness. Much has 
been written about the history of nation-building in East Africa (Tordoff 1967; Temu 
1969; Beinen 1970; Mamdani 1976; Hansen and Twaddle 1988; Geiger 1997). A quite 
separate literature has focused on East African urbanization (O’Connor 1983; Anderson 
and Rathbone 2000; Burton 2000; Bryceson and Potts 2006). Nonetheless, there has 
been scant attention accorded to how urbanization and nationalism relate to one another. 
By contrast, the literature on European urbanization has generated a wealth of insights 
into the interaction between urban population growth, economic change, and the 
formation of nation-states. Although European towns are generally portrayed as 
political catalysts for the breakdown of the agrarian feudal order, and the ascendance of 
nation-states and democratic processes, others cite cases of towns dominated by vested 
interests that resisted nationalist aspirations (Braudel 1973, 1982; Jones 1981; Munck 
1990; van Creveld 1999).  
Over the last three decades, Kampala, Bujumbura, Kigali, Asmara, and Mogadishu have 
experienced civil war, while Nairobi and Addis Ababa have witnessed violent 
demonstrations and the martyrdom of protestors at the hands of security forces. Only 
Dar es Salaam and Djibouti, a very small city-state, have remained comparatively 
tranquil in East Africa. Time and again, tribal divides are cited in the western media as 
the root cause of East Africa’s sporadic conflictual flare-ups. Amidst rapid urbanization, 
multi-ethnic populations have formed – yet, it seems that they have generally failed to 
exert sufficiently strong cosmopolitanism to ease ethnic tension and lubricate nation-
state formation and political stability.  
Dar es Salaam is exceptional in East Africa for having a record of relatively little ethnic 
tension, and remaining tranquil and true to its name, the ‘harbour of peace’. This paper 
explores the interface between ethnic and national identities in Tanzania’s capital city, 
focusing on Dar es Salaam’s ethnic foundations and their malleability with regard to 
nationalism, asking how nationalist identities were negotiated vis-à-vis existing local 
ethnic identities. How willing were ethnic groups that were indigenous to the locality to 
‘share’ the city, its land, and amenities with newcomer compatriots, given that the city 
was almost as new as the nation-state? How did their modus operandi affect nation-
building? 
2  The urban milieu: melding, or mêlée of national and ethnic identities 
Small groups with continual face-to-face encounters are widely believed to facilitate the 
development of trust, mutual support, and cooperation amongst individuals – and, 
ultimately, group solidarity (de Waal 2001, 2005). Urban areas defy such moral 
foundations. City populations grow to sizes far beyond the limits of interpersonal 
encounters, begging the question of how social distrust, economic envy, political 
friction, and violent confrontation are avoided in urban contexts.  
The issue of welfare collectivity surfaces at the tribal level as well. Tribal group identity 
represents a scaling up of associational ties beyond the bounds of small bands of   2
cooperating individuals as well, resting on the acceptance of a shared political 
allegiance, and common cultural values and restraints. Urban areas, by contrast, 
represent the spatial concentration of people of often dissimilar – and even discordant – 
cultural values who, nonetheless, encounter each other face-to-face both randomly and 
in various organized ways for purposes of economic and social interaction. Nationalism 
is, in many senses, even further removed from the security and trust of the small group, 
requiring people to identify abstractly with each other on the basis of a shared notion of 
collective welfare and progress.  
In his insightful book, Imagined Communities (1985), Benedict Anderson illustrates 
how the concept of nationalism is extremely remote from the daily experience of non-
industrial, primarily rural societies where people are accustomed to personally knowing 
the people with whom they interact. Anderson argues that nationalist consciousness in 
the colonial world of the twentieth century entailed the philosophical repositioning of 
minds – a change in time and space perception of the nascent national population. A 
decline of religiosity, the spread of the printed word and literacy, as well as the 
extension of certain languages beyond local boundaries to become major means of 
communication, make possible an ‘imagined community’ of people with a shared sense 
of welfare and temporality across bounded space. Nationalism denotes a scaling up of 
the collective welfare unit, an insistence on the sovereignty of the unit, and an 
awareness of the ‘other’ beyond one’s spatial boundaries.  
Gellner (1983), more from the historical experience of European nationalism, maintains 
that nation-states flourish where culture is homogenized under conditions of urban 
industrialization. Urban areas and education provide the necessary development of skills 
and social mobility, generating economic flexibility and harmony. A metropolitan ‘high 
culture’ congeals, which attracts adherents. Hobsbawm (1991) from a Marxist 
perspective, on the other hand, argues that nationalism is more exclusionist than 
inclusive in its effect. For Hobsbawm, those taking up the mantle of nationalism are, for 
the most part, highly instrumentalist in furthering their material interests relative to the 
population at large. Nonetheless, a common national identity emerges, often fuelled by 
the otherness of surrounding nation-states.  
Interestingly, Mamdani (1996, 2000) writing primarily about Uganda, posits that 
colonial indirect rule policies rigidly restricted Africans’ identity politically to that of 
the rural tribe, fettering nationalist aspirations. His position lends support to Gellner’s 
thesis on the importance of mobility and the urban experience in fostering a vibrant 
nationalism. However, Mamdani combines his stress on the dichotomy between rural 
tribal subjects and urban citizens with class analysis similar to Hobsbawm’s perspective. 
Iliffe’s (1979) work on Tanzanian nationalism, on the other hand, stresses the individual 
agency of nationalists in nation-building amidst ethnic pluralism. 
3  Dar es Salaam: harbour of multi-ethnic peace and creole culture 
Since the ninth century, the East African littoral was the site of trading between 
Africans and Arabs in a string of urban coastal settlements and the maritime spread of   3
the Swahili language, a creole lingua franca and associated culture.
1 Dar es Salaam was 
founded comparatively late, in 1866, at the instigation of the Omani Sultan Seyyid 
Majid, who recognized the potential of its sheltered, natural, deep-water port with 
regard to the strengthening of his Zanzibari ivory and slave trading empire.  
The matrilineal Zaramo people occupied the area at that time. They were recent arrivals 
who had responded to the request of local Shomvi
2 coastal traders to assist in warding 
off attacks during the political upheaval of the nineteenth-century slave trade (L.W. 
Swantz 1970; M.-L. Swantz 1970). Thereafter, the Zaramo were closely identified with 
the Shomvi. Zaramo women often married and bore the children of the Shomvi traders. 
Furthermore, many up-country Africans, who came to the coast as slaves, remained and 
were absorbed by the Zaramo; first, by working in their plantations and, later, through 
inter-marriage (Iliffe 1979). Hence, the Zaramo are not a cohesive tribal group with a 
clear identity. Being relatively recent migrants to the East African coast and of mixed 
ethnic origin themselves, they culturally accommodated themselves to the influx of 
successive waves of migrants of different racial and ethnic backgrounds.  
The intimate political and cultural ties between the Zaramo and Shomvi often make it 
difficult to distinguish them as two separate ethnic identities. The Shomvi were 
perceived as cosmopolitan town-dwelling traders and owners of coastal slave 
plantations (Nicholls 1971; Allen 1993). The Zaramo, on the other hand, were 
considered – by virtue of being African – to be the ‘original’ inhabitants who farmed the 
land.
 Nonetheless, the Zaramo were lodged between the extremes of slave and slave 
master in a polarized social hierarchy. Seeking to distinguish themselves from the 
African slave population, many aspired to Swahili metropolitan culture associated with 
Arab influence and Islam (ustaarabu), preferring to identify as Shomvi. The Zaramo’s 
dual identity afforded them claim to tribal clan ties and usufruct rural land rights, on the 
one hand, and participation in Swahili town culture, on the other (M.-L. Swantz 1970; 
Glassman 1995). 
Colonial authorities, intent on delineating tribal boundaries and authorities, were 
perplexed by the Zaramo’s lack of a clear tribal identity. They failed to acknowledge 
that coastal Swahili society – with its own common historical experience, culture, 
mercantile economy, and language – made it futile to try to disaggregate the Zaramo 
and Shomvi into separate ethnic categories, and defied the ethnic definitional rigidities 
of indirect rule (Allen 1993). Furthermore, neighbouring coastal ethnic groups – the 
Kutu, Matumbi, Rufiji, and Ndengereko, who shared the Swahili cultural identity and 
dance styles with the Zaramo – were part of this creole society (Tsuruta 2003).  
Similar to other mercantile-based creole cultures, the status hierarchy of Swahili society 
was softened by various avenues of social fluidity through polygamous marriage, slave 
concubinage, Islamic conversion, and participation in status-raising rituals (Mazrui and 
                                                 
1  Kiswahili is composed of Bantu grammatical structure with considerable Arabic vocabulary. For a 
discussion of the evolution of Swahili creole culture see Bryceson (2010). 
2  Localized term for the Shirazi, Arabs with legendary connections to Persia who are considered the 
‘old Swahili’, as opposed to newer Arab settlers, such as those of the Omani sultanate (Nurse and 
Spear 1985). Shirazi traders historically married daughters of local leaders. The Shomvi paid tribute to 
the Zaramo, a practice dating back to when the Shomvi enlisted the support of the Zaramo to repel the 
invading Kamba.   4
Shariff 1994; Glassman 1995). Supported by domestic slave labour, the affluent elite’s 
luxurious lifestyle encompassed a unique cuisine, intricate architectural features, and 
conspicuous dress styles with which the broader, lower-ranked Swahili population 
identified or which they even aspired to achieve.  
Dar es Salaam, founded as a planned settlement, received infrastructural investment 
from the Sultan, keen to build the settlement as a viable alternative to the far older slave 
port of Bagamoyo, where the Shomvi’s plantation interests were construed to be counter 
to the Sultan and other Omani Arabs’ interests.  
While the local African–Arab power balance was being contested, European rivalry 
between Britain, Germany, and France was threatening the Sultan’s dominance over the 
East African coast (Sheriff 1987). The Anglo-German agreement of 1886 restricted the 
Sultan’s claims to a 10-mile coastal strip, and imposed German custom duty collection 
at Dar es Salaam. The following year, the Germans insisted on extending their control 
over the full length of the East African coast. Suddenly, coastal politics erupted. The 
Bushiri rebellion, based on a coalition of the Swahili landed property elite, quickly 
spread along the coast. 
3.1 German  colonialism 
Dar es Salaam, where the intensity of the rebellion was relatively subdued compared 
with other Swahili towns, became the headquarters of the German East Africa Company 
in 1891. During the subsequent three decades, German rule laid the foundation for 
urban governance and resource access in Dar es Salaam. The Germans opted for an 
akida governance system based on the appointment of school-educated, Swahili-
speaking agents rather than one based on tribal authority (Iliffe 1979). After the 
Zaramo’s participation in the Maji Maji rebellion
3 of 1905, the akida system was further 
extended to all of the Zaramo’s tribal territory, undermining the authority of Zaramo 
pazi headmen and limiting the Zaramo’s scope for political expression (Beidelman 
1967). 
The economic and social fluidity of creolized urban Swahili society was thoroughly at 
odds with German colonialism. Dar es Salaam was racially zoned into ‘native’ and 
‘non-native’ areas in 1912. Administratively, the Zaramo became one of numerous 
‘native’ groups. Alongside their political marginalization, the Zaramo were declining as 
a proportion of the total town population. The Germans held the view that slavery had 
made the coastal population ‘indolent’, and therefore encouraged more ‘industrious’ up-
country migrants to work in the town. A labour survey of Dar es Salaam in 1894 
revealed a cosmopolitan unskilled labour force in which those identifying themselves as 
Zaramo fell just short of constituting a majority.
4  
                                                 
3 Becker  (2004)  argues that the Maji Maji rebellion was not only a reaction to colonial rule, but also an 
attack on the indigenous coastal elites by acephalous tribal people in south-east Tanzania, where the 
rebellion had its epicentre. The participation of the Zaramo in the rebellion could be interpreted as 
belying their dual character as a tribal group with acephalous matrilineal origins. See also Deutsch 
(2006). 
4  Out of 100 unskilled workers, 47 were Zaramo, 23 Swahili, and 30 from an assortment of tribes (Iliffe 
1979: 161).   5
The dwindling caravan trade and gradual abolishment of slavery during the German 
period undermined the economic position of the Zaramo and the Shomvi. The Zaramo 
commonly engaged in farming of rice in the valley bottoms, and coconut and cashew 
trees planted on the less fertile soils on small plots in the surrounding hilly areas around 
Dar es Salaam where they held usufruct rights. The Shomvi held larger plantations 
around the town but, without fresh supplies of slave labour, they were gradually selling 
their plantation holdings to Germans as freehold land (Baker 1931; McCleery 1939; 
Bryceson 1987). Shomvi traders were losing out to more competitive Indian traders. 
Their status as a local elite was being inverted with the imposition of German racial 
segregation and the exclusivity of ‘non-natives’. Lacking political assertiveness, the 
Zaramo’s and the Shomvi’s cultural ambiguity translated into a Swahili creole cultural 
identity, which was often denigrated by colonial officials and up-country African 
migrants alike.  
3.2 British  colonialism 
German colonialism was a transitory interlude of three decades. German East Africa 
was transferred to Britain as a League of Nations mandated territory following World 
War I. The mandate put checks on the degree to which European settlers could 
manoeuvre to procure land and labour at the expense of the welfare of Africans, with 
the intent of preventing the creation of a landless peasantry. This foundational principle 
of British colonial policy in Tanganyika rebounded in a curious way on African 
interests in urban areas. As Mamdani (1996) argues, Africans were designated as rural 
subjects rather than urban citizens. Their presence in town was strictly delimited in 
terms of employment and housing. The urban division of labour was monolithically 
racial: Europeans were government administrators, Asians were merchants and clerical 
staff, and Africans were almost exclusively manual labourers.  
Figure 1 shows that Europeans accounted for a minute proportion of the total 
population; Asian immigration was on the increase, boosted by their ‘non-native’ status 
under the mandate, and Africans, despite their urban settlement being officially 
discouraged, constituted roughly 70 per cent of the population throughout most of the 
British colonial period.  
British indirect rule in towns was invariably problematic, given the diverse tribal 
composition of the African urban population. However, in the eyes of the colonial 
administration the Zaramo–Shomvi posed a particular challenge because they did not 
constitute a ‘proper tribe’ in terms of clan structure, leadership, and customary land 
tenure. Their presence posed the threat of ‘detribalization’, challenging the essence of 
indirect rule and conjuring up worry of African moral degeneration and crime (Burton 
2002).    6
Figure 1: Dar es Salaam census population 
Source: Census data collated by Sutton (1970: 19). 
 
Zaramo village headmen in the settlements surrounding the town disregarded the 
authority of the government-appointed town jumbe, seemingly confirming the colonial 
fear of lawlessness. In turn, the non-Zaramo migrants who settled in the outlying 
settlements were loath to accept the authority of the Zaramo village headmen. During 
the 1940s, a Zaramo political identity began to take shape alongside Dar es Salaam’s 
wartime growth spurt and colonial attempts to reform the structure of native authorities 
and streamline the rural/urban divide in Zaramo administration. These developments 
might help to explain the enigmatic census figures showing the Zaramo as only 32 per 
cent in 1928, rising to 51 per cent in 1948.
5 It is likely that many Swahili people felt it 
was advantageous to be seen as an indigenous Zaramo during the 1940s.
6 
                                                 
5  Migration to Dar es Salaam from up-country was believed to have risen during and in the aftermath of 
World War II. 
6  In 1942, Dar es Salaam urban district and Temeke rural district were combined to form the Uzaramo 
district, which might have prodded people to identify as Zaramo. Dar es Salaam town had a separate 
governance structure of three appointed wakili with responsibility for 24 majumbe headmen, who 
were most involved in daily administrative matters at the neighbourhood level. Furthermore, a liwali 
was appointed to adjudicate Islamic law. In 1957, 50 per cent of the majumbe were Zaramo (Burton 
2002).   7
Table 1: Ethnic composition of Dar es Salaam, 1928–67* 
Ethnic  group  1895 1905 1928 1948 1957 1967 
Zaramo  47 27 32 51 36 27 
Swahili  23      
Rufiji     5 8 7 7 
Luguru       4 6 6 
Nyamwezi  7  26   3 5 5 
Others  23 47 63 34 46 55 
Note:   * The Tanzanian government did not record ethnic affiliations in the 1978, 1988 
and 2002 censuses. 
Sources:    1895 and 1905: Brennan (2002: 98), citing colonial estimates from a malarial 
survey (quoted in Anthony 1983). The noticeable decline of the Zaramo in 1905 
may have related to their participation in the Maji Maji rebellion, when their physical 
withdrawal from the city, or at least an unwillingness to identify as a Zaramo, could 
have influenced the tribal tallies. 
  1928: Brennan (2002: 100), citing Dar es Salaam Township Census 1928 List III, 
TNA 61/167/A/6 and Native census Dar-es-Salaam District, TNA 61/167/A/7. 
  1948–67; Mwamfupe (1994: 56) compilation of national census data. 
3.3  Incongruity of Swahili coastal identity and tribal political assertion  
Paradoxically, the Swahili began to recognize the opportunities of Dar es Salaam’s 
demographic growth and attempted to organize collectively on a tribal basis during the 
1940s. Brennan (2002) documents how both the Shomvi and the Zaramo came, 
politically, to the fore. The Shomvi’s initiative took the form of demanding freehold 
tenure over land in the Upanga area of the city that they had occupied since the German 
period. Previously, they had endeavoured to secure freehold title as individuals. When 
Upanga was slated for a major postwar housing development, they collectively began 
demanding freehold rights to their land. A Shomvi representative seized the opportunity 
of the visit to Dar es Salaam of the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, in 1946 to 
petition him: 
we Shomvi are the only real natives of this particular District for many 
generations … Though there are many who join in claiming the right to 
own land in these coastal regions but that does not give a true fact 
(Mahadi bin Mwinjuma to Arthur Creech-Jones, TAN 10849/1206/1, 
cited in Brennan 2002: 219).  
Their land claim was based on drawing boundaries marked by traditional Shomvi 
cemeteries. Rather than relying simply on German land title claims, the Shomvi were 
demanding the right to land on a tribal basis but, incongruously, with the aim of 
obtaining freehold rather than tribal usufruct rights. Although they met with initial 
success in the courts, the logical inconsistency of their tribal claim for non-native 
freehold was unacceptable in the eyes of the colonial state. The case dragged on for five   8
years. Finally, in 1953, the claim was dismissed. Trees and crops on tribal land in 
question could be bought and sold but not the land per se. 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the Shomvi sought to secure freehold land, 
the Zaramo were actively building tribal associational ties (Brennan 2002). The 
Wazaramo Union was formed in 1938, gaining momentum as an agency furthering the 
Zaramo’s political and economic interests during the following decade. Living 
proximate to Tanganyika’s largest Indian population concentration, the Zaramo were 
one of the first tribal groups to voice resentment against Indian traders’ profiteering – a 
resentment that would reverberate throughout the country in the 1950s. The Union’s 
bold demands captured the imagination of the coastal population and it began recruiting 
members from beyond the boundaries of Uzaramo, which met with suspicion from the 
Zaramo Native Authority. Its membership ballooned to 8000, bridging urban 
occupational and class divisions. Riding on a crest of popular support, the Union’s 
ambitions extended to nothing short of a separatist state along the lines of the Sultanate 
of Zanzibar but with an elected government, which would elevate the prestige and 
power of its leaders (Brennan 2002).  
But, in setting its political ambitions so high, the Wazaramo Union sowed the seeds of 
its demise. Without the support of the Zaramo Native Authority and African town 
leadership, the colonial government became increasingly wary of it. In the early 1950s, 
the Union started imploding, with chronic financial mismanagement and corruption on 
the part of leadership (Brennan 2002). By the late 1950s, eclipsed by the nationalist 
struggle, the Wazaramo Union’s main effort was directed at operating a bus from Dar es 
Salaam to the Zaramo heartland of Kisarawe (Vincent 1970).  
The Wazaramo Union and Shomvi land case both represented the disaggregation of the 
Zaramo–Shomvi–Arab continuum into a ‘tribal’ identity discourse aimed at securing 
resource access and power that ultimately translated into individual material 
advancement. Both rested on a broader backward-looking vision of Swahili creole 
society in its heyday prior to colonial rule. It could be argued that the timing and 
political content of these two initiatives amounted to the brief emergence of Swahili 
creolism as an ersatz nationalism in a period of burgeoning creative thinking about 
political alternatives to the colonial order. Inevitably, Swahili creolism was pushed 
aside by the nationalist imperative of that era. 
3.4  Nationalist activity in Dar es Salaam 
Dar es Salaam was a hotspot for nationalist awareness due to the pioneering efforts of a 
growing group of African intellectuals resident in and around the town during the 
1950s. The Wazaramo Union’s failed tribal-cum-nationalist initiative would have 
undoubtedly been observed first-hand by Julius Nyerere, then a young man teaching at 
Pugu Secondary School in the traditional heartland of Uzaramo. Nyerere was surfacing 
as an articulate spokesman of nationalist goals and a clever political strategist for the 
movement.  
Tanzanian nationalism is generally depicted as a process of widening people’s frame of 
reference and transposing the African social identity from that of tribe to nation-state. 
Paradoxically, within the early stages of nationalist activity, those identifying 
themselves along the Zaramo–Shomvi–Arab continuum of Swahili creolism temporarily   9
narrowed their social identity by adopting a tribal label. In so doing, they put themselves 
on par with tribal groups in Tanzania, clearing the way for a pan-territorial nationalist 
identity beyond that of the coastal Swahili society. The glue of Tanganyikan 
nationalism, in the first instance, was common African descent. Interestingly, the Arab 
segment of the Zaramo–Shomvi–Arab continuum associated itself with the African 
nationalist identity, in stark contrast to the separatist tendency Arabs displayed in 
Zanzibar. It is possible that the process of justifying Shomvi land claims on an African 
tribal basis might, paradoxically, have helped to pave the way for this outcome on the 
mainland.  
Throughout the 1950s, sensitive to popular sentiment, TANU (Tanganyika African 
National Union) remained restrictively a political party for Africans, strategically using 
regional and tribal associational ties to further its struggle for independence. While the 
inclinations of Nyerere were non-racial and non-tribal, TANU was cast as a party 
encompassing a wide spectrum of people with various views. The TANU leadership 
was heavily Dar es Salaam-based but, primarily, of migrant rather than coastal origin. 
Bibi Titi Mohamed, a Dar es Salaam-born Swahili
7 woman, was extremely successful in 
mobilizing the Swahili town-based vote for TANU. Her fame as an outspoken woman 
and singer, made her second only to Nyerere in terms of national recognition. However, 
in general, Tanganyikan national politics remained primarily a complex mosaic of local, 
mostly tribally-based political affiliations led by leaders with regional constituencies.  
Nyerere deftly removed the tribal element of national politics in 1960, by dissolving 
ethnic voluntary associations and announcing that chiefs would not be accorded 
political power at the local or national level by virtue of their hereditary titles. Instead, 
chiefs became cultural figureheads. These simple strictures had profound long-term 
effects, precluding the tribal power plays that are a feature of neighbouring East African 
countries. The ease with which Nyerere took this measure, and the lack of objection that 
followed, is likely to have arisen from a variety of sources: his unchallenged 
authoritative role in the nationalist movement’s mass mobilization; the fact that 
Tanzania has over 100 tribes, none of which had an overwhelming demographic 
majority; and, not least, the fact that the Swahili language had been chosen as the lingua 
franca for nationalist party activities and that the TANU party’s mass mobilization 
effort was headquartered in Dar es Salaam, a multi-ethnic town with cosmopolitan 
origins from its inception.  
National independence was achieved in 1961. Nyerere’s long presidency from then to 
1985 had the stated aim of eliminating ignorance, poverty and disease – unifying broad-
based objectives for the African population. Underpinned by an egalitarian philosophy 
of ujamaa, African socialism was premised on rural development and the avoidance of 
urban elitism. Nonetheless, urban dwellers had material concerns. Tens of thousands of 
urban migrants were being drawn to the nation’s political and commercial capital, Dar 
es Salaam. Urban housing was of particular concern. 
                                                 
7  Geiger (1997) notes that, in her interviews with Bibi Titi, she identified herself as generically Swahili 
or tribally Rufiji, Ndegereko, or Matumbi, depending on the context. She claims to have coached 
Nyerere in the use of Kiswahili idioms in public speaking.   10
3.5  Swahili as urban gatekeepers to ‘God’s property’ 
The pressing accommodation needs of Dar es Salaam’s expanding population after 
independence enhanced the value of Swahili property interests in housing and land, 
regardless of the socialist policies of the government. In 1971, the government’s 
response to the housing shortage was to nationalize all residential buildings valued over 
TShs 100,000 that were not the main residences of their owners. Many Asian apartment 
blocks became state property, whereas the less expensive Swahili houses providing 
private rental accommodation were largely exempt, allowing Swahili landlords to 
maintain their town-based rental income. The Swahili houses’ multi-tribal occupation 
and frequent tenant turnover were sources of ethnic mixing in the city. 
Meanwhile, the Zaramo’s rural land assets were being squeezed. Within Dar es Salaam, 
the post-independence development of factory production exposed parts of the 
Zaramo’s low-lying rice lands to toxic effluents. In 1973–74, serious food shortages 
coincided with the first international oil price rise. Contracting foreign exchange 
reserves made it difficult for the country to import staple foods. The government 
instigated the Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona (Agriculture for Life or Death) campaign, 
rallying the formally employed to farm on large plots temporarily allocated to their 
places of work. Exceptionally poorly organized, the campaign is unlikely to have 
contributed much to the city’s food supplies (Bryceson 1990). It did, however, open the 
floodgates for Dar es Salaam residents eager to secure access to farmland in and around 
Dar es Salaam and, ultimately, might have provided an inroad into residential land 
acquisition on the part of Dar es Salaam’s middle- and high-income earners, the vast 
majority being migrants to the city (Mwamfupe 1994).  
During the late 1960s and 1970s, roughly 12 per cent of the city’s land was residential. 
By 1996, it had climbed to 26 per cent. An extensive clandestine land market operated 
in the 1980s that surfaced openly during the 1990s and boomed as the city expanded in 
the millennium. Dar es Salaam has grown radially outwards along the four main roads 
leading upcountry, propelled by a process of social and spatial differentiation as middle-
class households settled along the Morogoro and Bagamoyo roads in the northern 
reaches of the city, while the Zaramo and other poorer households tended to concentrate 
away from the road or in the southern peri-urban areas in the direction of the Zaramo’s 
heartland (Mwamfupe 1994; Briggs and Mwamfupe 2000) (see Figure 1). 
Commonly, prospective land purchasers approached Zaramo village leaders with the 
request for a plot to cultivate crops. Zaramo leaders charged the outsiders ‘fees’ for the 
use of the land or outright sale (Sherrington 2006). In other cases, or in addition, the 
outsider would also have to reckon with a Zaramo farmer who laid claim to the usufruct 
rights of a particular parcel of land. The farmer was receptive to striking up deals that 
gave them cash in exchange for the land
8 and frequently provided them with a small 
income working as a casual labourer on the farm plot. This open door policy contrasted 
sharply with neighbouring countries, where principles of tribal land compelled the 
indigenous population not to sell land to outsiders, as evidenced especially by the 
Baganda of Kampala (Bryceson 2009).  
                                                 
8  Usually, the purchase of usufruct land was made under the guise of buying the crops and trees on the 
land, which was an entirely legal practice. Who ‘owned’ the land thereafter was, of course, legally 
disputable.   11
As one Zaramo commentator explained, when asked why his people were willing to sell 
the land of their birthplace, it would not be right to do otherwise, for this was mali ya 
mungu (God’s property). The land was for those who wanted to farm it and the Zaramo 
have never been keen farmers.
9 Despite the Zaramo’s lack of enthusiasm for farming, 
they nonetheless relied heavily on their own farm subsistence fallback, such that a ‘land 
poor’ group of farmers was arising alongside the large volume of land sales. Cultivation 
patterns of the peri-urban landscape altered from the characteristic cassava, rice and 
coconut, and cashew tree plantings of the Zaramo to the maize and banana production 
of the non-coastal migrant population (Mwamfupe 1994). The local Zaramo were 
usually phlegmatic, welcoming rather than condemning the influx. Devoid of tribal 
friction, the casual labour and petty trade opportunities of Dar es Salaam’s expanding 
city population compensated their agrarian land loss. 
4  Ethnicity, urbanization and nationalism in East Africa 
The rise of Tanzanian nationalism coincided with a strong surge towards urbanization. 
As elsewhere in East Africa, the 1950s was a period of vocal tribalism, much of it 
emanating from the capital city where articulate migrant people from various tribal 
areas rubbed shoulders and formed patterns of ethnic cooperation and competition that 
became engrained in the national ethos. Nationalist leaders had to create the ‘imagined 
community’ of the nation-state but, to gain political independence, they often took the 
shortcut of mobilizing on tribal lines, fanning tribal differences. 
The capital city was an ethnic microcosm of the nation-state. Living in a rapidly 
expanding urban space made one acutely aware of the ‘other’. Migrants who had been 
born and raised in rural areas amongst their tribal kith and kin formed the majority of 
the urban population. By contrast, in the city, neighbours and workmates were likely to 
be ethnic ‘strangers’, who could be hostile or friendly. Tranquillity of ethnic relations in 
the capital boded well for stability of the nation-state and it was in nation-builders’ 
long-term interests to encourage a shared identity and mutual support amongst the 
citizenry, regardless of ethnicity. However, beyond the political rhetoric, urban housing 
and land allocation patterns, which highlighted ethnic differences in access to economic 
resources and cultural preferences increased the likelihood of turmoil.  
Unlike most other capital cities in East Africa, Dar es Salaam had a more cosmopolitan 
heritage, located on the coast with a multi-cultural trading origin encapsulated in the 
melding and inter-marriage of Shomvi and Zaramo, an integral part of Tanzania’s creole 
Swahili culture. From the outset of urban growth, the Shomvi and Zaramo were prone to 
selling land given their precarious economic standing and lack of an agrarian tribal 
identity. In doing so, they facilitated incoming migrants’ access to land. Indigenous 
residents of other East African cities, acting within a tribal frame of mind, were 
generally far less likely to sell their land and sometimes formed a landlord class. This is 
exemplified by the Baganda of Kampala who were resented for retaining a tight hold on 
land in the Kibuga of Kampala (Southall and Gutkind 1957).  
                                                 
9  Author’s interview with M. Saidi, Dar es Salaam, 7 August 2007. The Zaramo, and other tribes who 
identified with coastal Swahili culture, traditionally associated agriculture work with that of a slave 
and preferred to project an urban or elevated class status.   12
The Zaramo, the Shomvi and, indeed, other coastal Swahili groups of Tanzania have 
had very low political visibility. Consequently, there has been scant attention to the role 
of Swahili creolism in Dar es Salaam’s urbanization process and Tanzania’s national 
development. The Swahili creole culture’s chameleon-like ethnic character, their 
association with the faded past history of the Omani mercantilist empire, their low 
levels of education, and their ostensive lack of success in the new economic order 
largely precluded them from being perceived as threatening or a source of resentment. 
They generally avoided involvement in politics, except for a short interlude during the 
1950s. Their sense of self-esteem derived primarily from their Swahili creole identity, 
Islamic faith, and nostalgia for a bygone era. Ironically, and counter to Gellner’s 
argument regarding nationalist homogenization, the Swahili, as the indigenous resource 
holders with an elite past associated with slavery, were marginalized rather than 
homogenized with the increasing numbers of migrants to Dar es Salaam. Unlike the 
Baganda of Kampala, the Kikuyu of Nairobi, the Tutsi of Kigali, and so on, the Zaramo 
and Shomvi of Dar es Salaam have been far from claiming, or even vying for, power in 
the Tanzanian nation-state. 
It can be argued that Nyerere’s decisions to circumvent tribal loyalties in politics on the 
eve of independence and to make Kiswahili the national language were measures that 
maximized nationalist aspirations as opposed to tribal particularism. The use of creole 
Kiswahili, instead of English or one of the country’s many tribal languages, was an 
inclusive policy reaching out to the broadest spectrum of the electorate. So too, banning 
chiefs avoided tribal elite capture. In effect, the rural tribal subject and urban 
cosmopolitan citizen dichotomy that Mamdani (1996) writes about was muted, as both 
rural and urban areas were subject to egalitarian goals of the country’s socialist national 
development strategy. 
In Tanzania, the dampening of an ethnic factor in the politics and economy of the 
national capital has facilitated the stability of the nation-state as a political entity. The 
Swahili population’s creole identity, founded on ethnic diversity, has been conducive to 
the tranquil growth of an urban metropolis. Dar es Salaam’s ethnic plurality tends to be 
a source of good-natured humour and social tolerance rather than hierarchical political 
and economic control. In the East African region as a whole, the transplanting of rural 
tribal identities to urban capitals has more often than not sparked urban tension, if not 
national dissension and violence. Uniquely, Dar es Salaam’s creole foundations and 
cosmopolitan outlook have helped to chart a more peaceful path to urbanization.   13
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